Can epistemic justification depend on social factors? Ashton and McKenna on feminist standpoint theory, justification, and the "causal/constitutive" distinction

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Título:
Can epistemic justification depend on social factors? Ashton and McKenna on feminist standpoint theory, justification, and the "causal/constitutive" distinction
Autor: Cormick, Claudio Javier
Assuntos: Ashton, Natalie ; Boghossian, Paul ; constructivism about justification ; epistemic relativism ; feminist standpoint theory ; McKenna, Robin ; objectivism about justification
Notas: RelationTypeNote: HasVersion -- 10.5281/zenodo.6040599
references": ["Ashton, Natalie Alana. \"Relativising Epistemic Advantage.\" In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. Routledge, 2019", "Ashton, Natalie Alana, \"Scientific Perspectives, Feminist Standpoints, and Non-Silly Relativism.\" In Knowledge from a Human Point of View, 71\u201385. Springer, Cham, 2020", "Ashton, Natalie Alana, and Robin McKenna. \"Situating Feminist Epistemology.\" Episteme 17, no. 1 (March 2020): 28\u201347. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.11", "Boghossian, Paul A. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford, 2007", "Intemann, Kristen. \"25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?\" Hypatia 25, no. 4 (2010): 778\u201396. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01138.x", "Mills, Charles W. \"Alternative Epistemologies.\" Social Theory and Practice 14, no. 3 (1988): 237\u201363", "Seidel, Markus. Epistemic Relativism. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014", "Tanesini, Alessandra. \"Standpoint Then and Now.\" In The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David K. Henderson, and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. New York London: Routledge, Taylor &Francis Group, 2020", "Wallen, Kim, and Jill E. Schneider. Reproduction in Context: Social and Environmental Influences on Reproduction. A Bradford Book, 1999", "Ashton, Natalie Alana. \"Relativising Epistemic Advantage.\" In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. Routledge, 2019. \u2014\u2014\u2014. \"Scientific Perspectives, Feminist Standpoints, and Non-Silly Relativism.\" In Knowledge from a Human Point of View, 71\u201385. Springer, Cham, 2020. Ashton, Natalie Alana, and Robin McKenna. \"Situating Feminist Epistemology.\" Episteme 17, no. 1 (March 2020): 28\u201347. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.11. Boghossian, Paul A. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford, 2007. Intemann, Kristen. \"25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?\" Hypatia 25, no. 4 (2010): 778\u201396. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01138.x. Mills, Charles W. \"Alternative Epistemologies.\" Social Theory and Practice 14, no. 3 (1988): 237\u201363. Seidel, Markus. Epistemic Relativism. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. Tanesini, Alessandra. \"Standpoint Then and Now.\" In The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David K. Henderson, and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. New York London: Routledge, Taylor &Francis Group, 2020. Wallen, Kim, and Jill E. Schneider. Reproduction in Context: Social and Environmental Influences on Reproduction. A Bradford Book, 1999. Wylie, Alison. \"Why Standpoint Matters.\" In Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology, edited by Robert Figueroa and Sandra G. Harding, 26\u201348. Routledge, 2003"]
10.5281/zenodo.6040599
Descrição: According to an interesting and thought-provoking article by Natalie Ashton and Robin McKenna, Paul Boghossian in Fear of Knowledge would have presented a “classical”, “objectivist” view of epistemic justification, which allegedly excludes “that social factors can determine what counts as evidence”. On the basis of this interpretation, the two authors find that a feminist history of science, which shows how certain societal advancements in the position of women did, actually, lead to the acceptance of certain (previously available) data as evidence for a given theory, would run counter to that classical view. I argue that Ashton and McKenna overlook the crucial difference between the merely descriptive tenet “social factors determine what data epistemic subjects take, in fact, to be evidence for a given theory” and the normative tenet “social factors determine what data can legitimately be taken to be evidence for a given theory”. Under the descriptive interpretation, the history they tell is clearly not incompatible with the “classical view”. And under the normative interpretation, a second ambiguity emerges: when social factors are supposed to “determine” what data can legitimately count as evidence, is this a rational or a causal sense of “determine”? Given that the authors themselves admit, relative to the specific story they tell, that we have an independent criterion (explanatory power) which justifies that we take certain data as justification for a given belief, then the only sense of “determine” which remains is the causal one−and in this sense, once again, the story they tell is perfectly compatible with a “classical view” of justification.
Editor: Zenodo
Data de criação/publicação: 2022
Idioma: Inglês

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Can epistemic justification depend on social factors? Ashton and McKenna on feminist standpoint theory, justification, and the "causal/constitutive" distinction

Cormick, Claudio Javier

Zenodo 2022

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