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Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia

Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima)

Journal of strategic studies, 2014-01, Vol.37 (1), p.91-134 [Periódico revisado por pares]

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Título:
Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia
Autor: Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima)
Assuntos: Arsenals ; Asymmetry ; Atomic weapons ; Deeds ; Deterrence ; Employment ; Experts ; Law ; Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Strategy ; Nuclear Weapons ; Russia ; Russian Federation ; Theater ; Weapons
É parte de: Journal of strategic studies, 2014-01, Vol.37 (1), p.91-134
Notas: ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
Descrição: Russian reliance on its non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been an ongoing concern for security experts. What is the Russian de facto employment doctrine for this arsenal? This article argues that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them. This study disentangles Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it. Situating the Russian case in the comparative context, the article argues that establishing a coherent theater nuclear posture and streamlining it with the national level deterrence strategy is a demanding and frequently unfulfilled task. It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.
Editor: London: Routledge
Idioma: Inglês

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