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Bidding behavior given point and interval values in a second-price auction

Banerjee, Prasenjit ; Shogren, Jason F.

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Jan, 2014, Vol.97, p.126(12) [Periódico revisado por pares]

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  • Título:
    Bidding behavior given point and interval values in a second-price auction
  • Autor: Banerjee, Prasenjit ; Shogren, Jason F.
  • Assuntos: Auctions
  • É parte de: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Jan, 2014, Vol.97, p.126(12)
  • Descrição: To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.10.002 Byline: Prasenjit Banerjee, Jason F. Shogren Abstract: acents We investigate preference elicitation when we treat behavioralist with coherent arbitrariness as rational and vise-versa. acents We use a second-price auction to test bidding behavior given either point or interval values and either point and interval bidding. acents People prefer the flexibility of the interval bid, but they behave rationally as expected bids are mostly expected values. Author Affiliation: (a) University of Manchester, Economics, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK (b) University of Wyoming, Economics, Laramie, WY 82072, USA Article History: Received 22 June 2012; Revised 2 September 2013; Accepted 12 October 2013 Article Note: (footnote) [star] We thank the Bugas and Stroock funds for the partial financial support, the reviewers and Nicolas Jacquemet for their useful comments, and Pritam Gupta and Amrita Mukherjee for laboratory assistance. Shogren thanks the Norwegian University of Life Sciences for the support.
  • Idioma: English

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