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Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments

Aryal, Gaurab ; Bhuller, Manudeep ; Lange, Fabian

The American economic review, 2022-05, Vol.112 (5), p.1669-1702 [Periódico revisado por pares]

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Título:
Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments
Autor: Aryal, Gaurab ; Bhuller, Manudeep ; Lange, Fabian
É parte de: The American economic review, 2022-05, Vol.112 (5), p.1669-1702
Notas: NFR/275123
Descrição: This paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed ) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across noncentral and central municipalities in Norway to, respectively, construct hidden and transparent instruments. We estimate a private return of 7.9 percent, of which 70 percent is due to increased productivity and the remaining 30 percent is due to signaling. (JEL D82, H75, I26, I28, J24, J31)
Idioma: Inglês;Norueguês

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