Idioma:

Is R. Rorty’s Moral Philosophy Possible? Antifoundationalism and Kant’s Criticism

Alijauskaitė, Agnė

Problemos, 2019-10, Vol.96, p.36-47

Texto completo disponível

Citações Citado por

Título:
Is R. Rorty’s Moral Philosophy Possible? Antifoundationalism and Kant’s Criticism
Autor: Alijauskaitė, Agnė
Assuntos: ethics ; Kantian ethics ; metaphilosophy ; moral philosophy ; Richard Rorty
É parte de: Problemos, 2019-10, Vol.96, p.36-47
Descrição: This article aims to answer the main question raised – is Rorty’s moral philosophy possible? To what extent is it possible to treat it as an authentic theory? Rorty’s criticism of Kant and the Kantians, as one of the key points of contemporary moral philosophy, determines the posture in the moral domain and provides a certain place in discourse. The article states that, despite the fact that Rorty’s moral philosophy is not based on a particular theoretical concept, it can be considered as a fragmented whole consisting of several parts, one of which is the agent’s openness to the choice of moral identity. At the same time, we will critically question the position of Rorty himself – while maintaining the suspicion towards the sources of moral knowledge, he maintains an insufficient distance with one of his own sources of moral knowledge, namely historical progress.
Editor: Vilnius University Press
Idioma: Inglês

Voltar para lista de resultados