skip to main content
Visitante
Meu Espaço
Minha Conta
Sair
Identificação
This feature requires javascript
Tags
Revistas Eletrônicas (eJournals)
Livros Eletrônicos (eBooks)
Bases de Dados
Bibliotecas USP
Ajuda
Ajuda
Idioma:
Inglês
Espanhol
Português
This feature required javascript
This feature requires javascript
Primo Search
Busca Geral
Busca Geral
Acervo Físico
Acervo Físico
Produção Intelectual da USP
Produção USP
Search For:
Clear Search Box
Search in:
Busca Geral
Or select another collection:
Search in:
Busca Geral
Busca Avançada
Busca por Índices
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Over-Determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities
Petersson, Bjöm
Ethical theory and moral practice, 2018-08, Vol.21 (4), p.841-850
[Periódico revisado por pares]
Dordrecht: Springer
Texto completo disponível
Citações
Citado por
Exibir Online
Detalhes
Resenhas & Tags
Mais Opções
Nº de Citações
This feature requires javascript
Enviar para
Adicionar ao Meu Espaço
Remover do Meu Espaço
E-mail (máximo 30 registros por vez)
Imprimir
Link permanente
Referência
EasyBib
EndNote
RefWorks
del.icio.us
Exportar RIS
Exportar BibTeX
This feature requires javascript
Título:
Over-Determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities
Autor:
Petersson, Bjöm
Assuntos:
Accountability
;
Analysis
;
Coresponsibility
;
Counterfactual thinking
;
Criticism and interpretation
;
Education
;
Ethics
;
Feit
;
Filosofi
;
Filosofi, etik och religion
;
Harm
;
Harm principle (Ethics)
;
Holding
;
Humaniora och konst
;
Humanities
;
Ontology
;
Over-determination
;
Parfit
;
Parfit, Derek
;
Philosophers
;
Philosophy
;
Philosophy of Medicine
;
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
;
Plural harm
;
Political Philosophy
;
Pre-emption
;
Theory of Medicine/Bioethics
É parte de:
Ethical theory and moral practice, 2018-08, Vol.21 (4), p.841-850
Descrição:
A popular strategy for meeting over-determination and pre-emption challenges to the comparative counterfactual conception of harm is Derek Parfit 's suggestion, more recently defended by Neil Feit, that a plurality of events harms A if and only if that plurality is the smallest plurality of events such that, if none of them had occurred, A would have been better off. This analysis of 'harm' rests on a simple but natural mistake about the relevant counterfactual comparison. Pluralities fulfilling these conditions make no difference to the worse for anyone in the over-determination cases that prompted the need for revising the comparative conception of harm to begin with. We may choose to call them harmful anyway, but then we must abandon the idea that making a difference to the worse for someone is essential to harming. I argue that we should hold on to the difference-making criterion and give up the plural harm principle. I offer an explanation of why Parfit's and Feit's plural harm approach seems attractive. Finally, I argue that the consequences of giving up the plural harm principle and holding on to the simple comparative counterfactual analysis of harm are less radical than we may think, in relation to questions about wrongness and responsibility.
Editor:
Dordrecht: Springer
Idioma:
Inglês
Links
View record from Swedish Publication Index
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Voltar para lista de resultados
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Buscando em bases de dados remotas. Favor aguardar.
Buscando por
em
scope:(USP_PRODUCAO),scope:(USP_EBOOKS),scope:("PRIMO"),scope:(USP),scope:(USP_EREVISTAS),scope:(USP_FISICO),primo_central_multiple_fe
Mostrar o que foi encontrado até o momento
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript