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The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood: What Does the Future Hold?

Hedges, Matthew ; Cafiero, Giorgio

Middle East policy, 2017-03, Vol.24 (1), p.129-153 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Washington: Middle East Policy Council

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  • Título:
    The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood: What Does the Future Hold?
  • Autor: Hedges, Matthew ; Cafiero, Giorgio
  • Assuntos: Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf ; Foreign policy ; Guerrilla forces ; Middle East ; Muslims ; Paramilitary groups ; Political movements ; Political parties ; Politics ; Regional security ; Social change ; Society of Muslim Brothers ; Terrorist organizations ; Theology
  • É parte de: Middle East policy, 2017-03, Vol.24 (1), p.129-153
  • Notas: ObjectType-Article-1
    SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
    ObjectType-Feature-2
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  • Descrição: The history of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB or Ikhwan) movement in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has varied considerably among its six members. Influenced by distinct political, social and theological landscapes, as well as differing foreign-policy agendas, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have always assessed the MB differently. Some Gulf Arab monarchies view the movement as a threat to their very survival and regional security. Others perceive the MB as a useful political ally or, at least, a legitimate opposition group, in the face of other internal and external threats such as the expansion of Iranian/Shiite influence and the rise of more extreme Sunni Islamist actors such as Islamic State (Daesh) and al-Qaeda. For decades, leadership preferences, foreign-policy strategies and realpolitik have prompted GCC policy fluidity towards the Ikhwan. The formal rise to power of the Egyptian MB and the movement's prominent influence in Jordanian, Libyan, Tunisian, Turkish and Yemeni politics have reemphasized the challenge to GCC rulers. According to some of the MB’s critics, its ambiguous agenda within Middle Eastern society lends weight to the argument that the MB is inherently an entity predisposed to concealing its true modus operandi. At its core, the Ikhwan is an anti-establishment republican entity determined to accumulate power. While the GCC states have fragile social dynamics — from sectarian strife to tribal rivalries and competition among merchant families — it is their regional policies that have predominantly formed Gulf Arab rulers’ perception of the MB. The evolving relationship between Saudi Arabia and the MB best exemplifies this point. Under the leadership of King Abdullah (2005-15), Saudi Arabia had generally poor relations with the Ikhwan, viewing it as a threat to the kingdom’s own Islamic legitimacy. In the aftermath of the Arab world’s 2011 uprisings, Saudi Arabia and the UAE actively pressured other GCC members to crack down on the movement in an effort to establish a “Muslim Brotherhood-free security environment” in the Arabian Peninsula.
  • Editor: Washington: Middle East Policy Council
  • Idioma: Inglês

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