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Untrue Concepts in Hegel's Logic

Alznauer, Mark

Journal of the history of philosophy, 2023, Vol.61 (1), p.103-126 [Periódico revisado por pares]

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Título:
Untrue Concepts in Hegel's Logic
Autor: Alznauer, Mark
Assuntos: Agreements ; Logic ; Philosophers ; Truth
É parte de: Journal of the history of philosophy, 2023, Vol.61 (1), p.103-126
Descrição: In the following, I argue that Hegel took concepts—not propositions, judgments, or spatiotemporal objects—as the primary truth-bearer in his logic and attempt to offer a defensible interpretation of what it means for an individual concept (or "thought-determination") to be assessed as true or untrue. Along the way, I consider the shortcomings of several alternative interpretations of truth in Hegelian logic, paying particular attention to the now-common contention that a commitment to something like Frege's context principle prevents Hegel from assessing concepts independently of the role that they play in judgments.
Editor: Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Idioma: Inglês

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