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Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara Dos Deputados, 1989–98

Amorim Neto, Octavio ; Cox, Gary W. ; McCubbins, Mathew D.

World politics, 2003-07, Vol.55 (4), p.550-578 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

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Título:
Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara Dos Deputados, 1989–98
Autor: Amorim Neto, Octavio ; Cox, Gary W. ; McCubbins, Mathew D.
Assuntos: 1985-2002 ; 20th century ; Agenda Setting ; Brazil ; Brazil. Congresso Nacional. Câmara dos Deputados ; Cartels ; Chamber of deputies ; Coalitions ; Executive-legislative relations ; Government ; Government and politics ; Government cabinets ; Heads of state ; History ; International politics ; Legislative Bodies ; Legislative power ; Legislative Process ; Legislatures ; Majority governments ; Parliament ; Parliamentary government ; Parliamentary history ; Parliamentary organization ; Parliamentary practice ; Parliamentary system ; Political coalitions ; Political parties ; Political Power ; Political science ; Politics and government ; Presidential powers ; Presidents ; Regulation ; Statutory law ; Veto ; Voting
É parte de: World politics, 2003-07, Vol.55 (4), p.550-578
Notas: istex:D7A64DE640D1CD3982D3BD4CDA793C3D447B8B7E
ArticleID:00615
PII:S0043887100006158
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 2000, at the Centre for Brazilian Studies at Oxford University in October 2000, and at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro in August 2002.
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Descrição: This article examines a general proposition about democratic legislatures—that their agenda will be cartelized by any majority government—in the context of a case study of the Brazilian Camara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). The main question is to identify when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 Camara. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands' a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to veto the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the Camara faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chooses to form such an alliance—a presidentially led agenda cartel—then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that split the governing coalition. The authors find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentially led agenda cartel. In this sense, the argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi, who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. The results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.
Editor: Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
Idioma: Inglês

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Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara Dos Deputados, 1989–98

Amorim Neto, Octavio ; Cox, Gary W. ; McCubbins, Mathew D.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

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