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The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communication

Broockman, David E. ; Butler, Daniel M.

American journal of political science, 2017-01, Vol.61 (1), p.208-221 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Oxford: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc

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  • Título:
    The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communication
  • Autor: Broockman, David E. ; Butler, Daniel M.
  • Assuntos: Attitudes ; Communication ; Cooperation ; Experiments ; Judgments ; Justification ; Legislators ; Political science ; Politicians ; Public opinion ; States ; United States ; Voters
  • É parte de: American journal of political science, 2017-01, Vol.61 (1), p.208-221
  • Notas: We acknowledge the Yale Institution for Social and Policy Studies for supporting this research. We thank Jonathan Bendor, Anthony Fowler, Sean Freeder, Sean Gailmard, Andy Hall, Gabe Lenz, David Reiley, Eric Schickler, Shad Turney, Rob van Houweling, and seminar participants at the University of Chicago, Princeton, NYU, UCSD, and the Toronto Political Behavior Workshop for comments. We thank Nathaniel Parks, Chris Brill, and Matt Taverna at TargetSmart Communications for providing voter data and Brian Steblay at Winning Connections for overseeing the survey administration. All remaining errors are our own.
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  • Descrição: Influential theories depict politicians as, alternatively, strongly constrained by public opinion, able to shape public opinion with persuasive appeals, or relatively unconstrained by public opinion and able to shape it merely by announcing their positions. To test these theories, we conducted unique field experiments in cooperation with sitting politicians in which U.S. state legislators sent constituents official communications with randomly assigned content. The legislators sometimes stated their issue positions in these letters, sometimes supported by extensive arguments but sometimes minimally justified; in many cases, these issue positions were at odds with voters'. An ostensibly unrelated survey found that voters often adopted the positions legislators took, even when legislators offered little justification. Moreover, voters did not evaluate their legislators more negatively when representatives took positions these voters had previously opposed, again regardless of whether legislators provided justifications. The findings are consistent with theories suggesting voters often defer to politicians' policy judgments.
  • Editor: Oxford: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
  • Idioma: Inglês

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