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On the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic search games

Álvarez Faura, M. del Carme ; Duch Brown, Amalia ; Serna Iglesias, María José ; Thilikos Touloupas, Dimitrios

2011

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  • Título:
    On the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic search games
  • Autor: Álvarez Faura, M. del Carme ; Duch Brown, Amalia ; Serna Iglesias, María José ; Thilikos Touloupas, Dimitrios
  • Assuntos: Aprenentatge automàtic ; Game theory ; General multiagent framework ; Informàtica ; Intel·ligència artificial ; Jocs, Teoria de ; Machine learning ; Multiagent systems ; Nash equilibria existence ; Sistemes multiagent ; Strategic search games ; Àrees temàtiques de la UPC
  • Descrição: We consider a general multi-agent framework in which a set of n agents are roaming a network where m valuable and sharable goods (resources, services, information ...) are hidden in m different vertices of the network. We analyze several strategic situations that arise in this setting by means of game theory. To do so, we introduce a class of strategic games that we call strategic search games. In those games agents have to select a simple path in the network that starts from a predetermined set of initial vertices. Depending on how the value of the retrieved goods is splitted among the agents, we consider two game types: finders-share in which the agents that find a good split among them the corresponding benefit and firsts-share in which only the agents that first find a good share the corresponding benefit. We show that finders-share games always have pure Nash equilibria (pne ). For obtaining this result, we introduce the notion of Nash-preserving reduction between strategic games. We show that finders-share games are Nash-reducible to single-source network congestion games. This is done through a series of Nash-preserving reductions. For firsts-share games we show the existence of games with and without pne. Furthermore, we identify some graph families in which the firsts-share game has always a pne that is computable in polynomial time. Peer Reviewed
  • Data de criação/publicação: 2011
  • Idioma: Inglês
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  • Realização: ABCD-USP USP   Logos de Redes Sociais: Freepik

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