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How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk

Pitchford, Rohan

The American economic review, 1995-12, Vol.85 (5), p.1171-1186 [Periódico revisado por pares]

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Título:
How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk
Autor: Pitchford, Rohan
Assuntos: Accidents ; Bank liabilities ; Bankruptcy ; Business structures ; CERCLA 1980-US ; Economic models ; Economic policy ; Economic theory ; Efficiency ; Environmental law ; Environmental regulations ; Equity ; Financial liabilities ; Law ; Lender liability ; Lenders ; Liability ; Limited liability ; Loans ; State court decisions ; Studies ; Surplus ; Vicarious liability ; Victim compensation
É parte de: The American economic review, 1995-12, Vol.85 (5), p.1171-1186
Notas: ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
Descrição: Recently, U.S. environmental law has shown a tendency toward increased lender liability. A model of a potentially judgment-proof owner of a firm, a lender, and a potential victim is developed in which this policy can increase accident frequency and reduce efficiency. Full, partial, and zero lender-liability rules and a minimum equity requirement are analyzed. Partial lender liability and an equivalent minimum equity requirement deliver the highest level of efficiency, although the former can deliver a higher contribution by the lender to the victim than the latter. Policy and empirical implications are also discussed.
Editor: Menasha, Wis: American Economic Association
Idioma: Inglês

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