skip to main content
Visitante
Meu Espaço
Minha Conta
Sair
Identificação
This feature requires javascript
Tags
Revistas Eletrônicas (eJournals)
Livros Eletrônicos (eBooks)
Bases de Dados
Bibliotecas USP
Ajuda
Ajuda
Idioma:
Inglês
Espanhol
Português
This feature required javascript
This feature requires javascript
Primo Search
Busca Geral
Busca Geral
Acervo Físico
Acervo Físico
Produção Intelectual da USP
Produção USP
Search For:
Clear Search Box
Search in:
Busca Geral
Or hit Enter to replace search target
Or select another collection:
Search in:
Busca Geral
Busca Avançada
Busca por Índices
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Non-EU interest groups in Brussels: explaining the lobbying success of foreign interest groups in EU energy policy
Popovic, Ivana
2019
Texto completo disponível
Citações
Citado por
Exibir Online
Detalhes
Resenhas & Tags
Mais Opções
Nº de Citações
This feature requires javascript
Enviar para
Adicionar ao Meu Espaço
Remover do Meu Espaço
E-mail (máximo 30 registros por vez)
Imprimir
Link permanente
Referência
EasyBib
EndNote
RefWorks
del.icio.us
Exportar RIS
Exportar BibTeX
This feature requires javascript
Título:
Non-EU interest groups in Brussels: explaining the lobbying success of foreign interest groups in EU energy policy
Autor:
Popovic, Ivana
Assuntos:
JN Political institutions (Europe)
Descrição:
Although the number of non-EU interest groups seeking to exert political influence in Brussels has been rising, research examining factors behind their success is scarce. This thesis contributes towards filling this gap by examining the success of foreign groups in the energy policy domain. Specifically, it examines how the European Commission’s initial preferences on both - the policies under consideration as well as the involved non-EU interest groups - affect the groups’ prospects of lobbying successfully. Employing process-tracing and cross-case comparison, the thesis explores four cases of Commission proposals covering the main aspects of the EU energy policy: competitiveness, sustainability and security. The extant literature on lobbying as information exchange assumes that the Commission has strong preferences regarding outcomes, but not on policy measures generating the desired outcomes. Interest groups, in return, shape a Commission’s proposal by providing expertise on which policies will lead towards the outcomes. The thesis complements this literature by arguing that in some cases, decision-makers have strong preferences concerning both - the outcomes and means necessary to achieve them - thus making interests groups’ attempts to alter their positions less likely to succeed. However, in the absence of the Commission holding strong views on policies, there is no guarantee that an interest group will be successful. Instead, a group’s success is affected by its status within the Commission. Drawing on research on the insider/outsider status of lobbyists, the thesis finds evidence that insiders are more likely to lobby successfully than outsiders. It contributes to this strand of literature by introducing an additional criterion underpinning the insider/outsider distinction, which concern specifically non-EU interest groups. Thus, the research suggests that a foreign interest group’s prospect of lobbying successfully is affected by the Commission’s positions on policies and involved lobbyists: how strong its initial view on issues under consideration is, as well as whether it sees interest groups as “insiders” or “outsiders”.
Data de criação/publicação:
2019
Links
View record in London School of Economics$$FView record in $$GLondon School of Economics
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Voltar para lista de resultados
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Buscando em bases de dados remotas. Favor aguardar.
Buscando por
em
scope:(USP_VIDEOS),scope:("PRIMO"),scope:(USP_FISICO),scope:(USP_EREVISTAS),scope:(USP),scope:(USP_EBOOKS),scope:(USP_PRODUCAO),primo_central_multiple_fe
Mostrar o que foi encontrado até o momento
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript