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Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia

Buonanno, Paolo ; Durante, Ruben ; Prarolo, Giovanni ; Vanin, Paolo

The Economic journal (London), 2015-08, Vol.125 (586), p.F175-F202 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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  • Título:
    Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia
  • Autor: Buonanno, Paolo ; Durante, Ruben ; Prarolo, Giovanni ; Vanin, Paolo
  • Assuntos: Economics and Finance ; Exports ; FEATURE: ORGANISED CRIME ; Humanities and Social Sciences ; Law enforcement ; Organized crime ; Property rights ; Studies
  • É parte de: The Economic journal (London), 2015-08, Vol.125 (586), p.F175-F202
  • Notas: istex:DAF99D7E5163CA01D033CF3DC12ACFAC70AAD305
    ArticleID:ECOJ12236
    Appendix A. Role of Citrus Cultivation.Data S1.
    ark:/67375/WNG-LCRJLD5M-G
    We are grateful to the editor Stephen Machin and an anonymous referee for their remarks. We also thank Francesco Amodio, Oriana Bandiera, Giorgio Chiovelli, Francesco Cinnirella, Carl‐Johan Dalgaard, Alfredo Del Monte, Arcangelo Dimico, Giovanni Federico, Oded Galor, Diego Gambetta, Paola Giuliano, Luigi Guiso, Nathan Nunn, Paolo Pinotti, Nancy Qian, Mathias Thoenig, David Weil and one anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank participants in the Transatlantic Workshop on the Economics of Crime, the Frontier Research in Economic and Social History Meeting, the CEPR‐EIEF Conference on Economics of Interactions and Culture, the Conference on Intergenerational Transmission of Entrepreneurship, Occupations and Cultural Traits in the Process of Long‐run Economic Growth, the SIE Conference, the 2013 annual Conference of the Royal Economic Society and the 2013 NBER Summer Institute and seminar participants at DIW, Collegio Carlo Alberto, University of Barcelona, University of Bologna, University of Neuchatel, Free University of Berlin and University of San Andrés, PUC Rio de Janeiro, and University of Milan for helpful discussion. All errors are our own. All necessary data sets and programs to replicate results are available online.
  • Descrição: With weak law-enforcement institutions, a positive shock to the value of natural resources may increase demand for private protection and opportunities for rent appropriation through extortion, favouring the emergence of mafia-type organisations. We test this hypothesis by investigating the emergence of the mafia in twentieth century Sicily, where a severe lack of state property-rights enforcement coincided with a steep rise in international demand for sulphur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity. Using historical data on the early incidence of mafia activity and on the distribution of sulphur reserves, we document that the mafia was more present in municipalities with greater sulphur availability.
  • Editor: Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • Idioma: Inglês
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  • Realização: ABCD-USP USP   Logos de Redes Sociais: Freepik

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